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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLINT L. COLVIN, 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee. 
Appellate Court Case No. 20050545-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: The trial court erred in allowing the jury instruction which included the 
language "obviates all reasonable doubt" as it unconstitutionally lowered the State's 
burden of proof, and thus incorrectly stated the law to the jury and warranted a new trial. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews whether a trial court's jury instruction 
correctly stated the law under a "correction of error standard, with no particular deference 
given to the trial court's ruling." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). 
2 
Preservation: The unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction was plain error 
resulting in a manifest injustice. 
Issue II: The trial court erred in determining that trial counsel did not fail to 
provide effective assistance of counsel when he failed to argue for correct jury 
instructions, failed to call witnesses whose testimony could have exonerated Defendant, 
and failed to obtain crucial discovery documents after having been informed they existed. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews whether a defendant was afforded 
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 
203, 73 P.3d 967; State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation: Appellant is now appealing the decision of the trial court 
which found that Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel decided in 
denial of Appellants motion for a new trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19(e) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 4, 2003, Defendant was charged with one count of Communications 
Fraud, a second degree felony. Defendant went to trial on November 16-19, 2004, and 
the jury received the case. The jury convicted the Defendant and on February 28, 2005, 
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Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence at the Utah State Prison of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years, however this sentence was suspended. 
Defendant was also sentenced to 180 days in the Davis County Jail and was granted work 
release. A fine of $18,500 was suspended, Defendant was ordered to perform 100 hours 
community service, and was placed on 36 months probation. The Defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial on March 14, 2005, citing ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady 
violations, insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty and erroneous jury 
instructions. Following an evidentiary hearing the Defendant's motion was denied on 
May 17, 2005. An order denying the motion was entered July 27, 2005. The Defendant 
filed a Notice of Appeal on June 16, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 4, 2003, Clint L. Colvin ("Mr. Colvin") was charged with one count of 
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony. Mr. Colvin went to trial on November 
16-19,2004. 
Mr. Colvin was convicted of defrauding his employer, Carrier Lumping Services, 
of $88,000 over a period of one year by collecting semi-truck unloading fees at Smith's 
Foods warehouse unloading docks and keeping two forms of documentation to cover the 
cash he collected. Carrier Lumping Services contracted to unload all semi trailers and 
other delivery trucks at the warehouse. The State claimed that instead of depositing the 
unloading fees he obtained from the drivers, Mr. Colvin gave the money to Brandon 
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Hamblin who gave some of the money back to Mr. Colvin. Colvin testified in his own 
defense that he acted at the general manager, Brandon Hamblin's direction. Mr. Hamblin 
entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced on March 30, 2004. 
Prior to commencement of the trial, counsel failed to fully investigate or call 
witnesses as suggested by the defendant who could potentially have exonerated him. 
Additionally, trial counsel failed to obtain and investigate crucial discovery documents 
even though he was aware of their availability, going so far as to file a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum and an Order to Show Cause, which was subsequently cancelled by trial counsel 
during a telephonic conference with the Court and the State. 
Trial counsel failed to present any defense in addition to the "poor accounting 
practices" of Carrier Lumping and failed to present a defense arguing the absence of the 
required mens rea. 
The jury received the case, following a reasonable doubt instruction that read: 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the state to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You must keep in mind in assessing whether 
the State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the burden 
never shifts to the defendant to call any witnesses, produce any evidence, or 
disprove any element of the crime charged. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not require proof to an absolute certainty. "Reasonable doubt" means a doubt that 
is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must 
be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or 
based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfied the mind, convinces the understanding of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in this case. 
The jury convicted Mr. Colvin, and on February 28, 2005, he was sentenced. He 
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filed a motion for a new trial on March 14, 2005, citing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Brady violations, insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty, and erroneous jury 
instructions. This motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing on May 17, 2005. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in determining that the defendant was afforded effective 
assistance of counsel throughout the trial court proceedings, given trial counsel's failure 
to investigate and call potential exculpatory witnesses, his failure to obtain and review 
crucial discovery documents after being informed of their existence, and his failure to 
argue for correct jury instructions. In addition, the trial court erred in giving the jury an 
instruction on reasonable doubt which included the language "obviates all reasonable 
doubt" as it unconstitutionally lowered the State's burden of proof. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL 
BECAUSE HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AT TRIAL 
A new trial should be granted because trial counsel was deficient to a degree that 
prejudiced the appellant, and gave rise to an unfair and unreliable result. Trial counsel 
was ineffective in that he failed to fully investigate and call crucial defense witnesses 
which would have exonerated the defendant, failed to obtain crucial discovery documents 
after being informed that they existed, and failed to argue for correct jury instructions. 
Both the United States and the Utah Constitutions provide that in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his 
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defense. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. 1 § 12. This right to counsel has been 
held to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 n.14, 90 S.ct. 1441, 1449 n.14 (1970); see also State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 
204 (Utah 1976). In determining whether criminal defendants, by reason of the 
performance of counsel, have been denied their constitutional right to counsel, Utah 
courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's test as articulated in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.ct. 2052 (1984). To demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it must be shown that trial counsel "(1) rendered deficient 
performance, or performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced [the 
Appellant.]" State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
Appellant's trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, which resulted in prejudice to the defendant and 
ultimately led to an unreliable result. 
A. Failure to Investigate and Call Crucial Defense Witnesses 
The Appellant's trial counsel failed to investigate and call crucial defense 
witnesses whose testimony would have exonerated the defendant. A critical fact in this 
case was that Defendant made payments directly to Brandon Hamblin. Trial counsel was 
informed by the Appellant, that there existed multiple witnesses who could corroborate 
his story and testify that they also gave the funds they collected as dock leads directly to 
Brandon Hamblin on the belief that this was the standard and appropriate procedure. 
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(Evid. Hrng. Rec. at 82-3). Appellant stated that Casey Nielsen, Kelly Martinez, Dirk 
Nelson, Shawn Spencer, and Tony Moore all held positions as dock leads or backups and 
would have testified that Mr. Hamblin collected all the funds they collected and 
established the procedures on the various docks. (Id). Appellant further testified that he 
gave the names of these individuals as well as additional information to trial counsel on 
the assumption that they would be called as witnesses, and further stated that it was trial 
counsel's decision, not his, to not call them because "they wouldn't prove [his] 
innocence." (Evid. Hrng. Rec. at 84). At the evidentiary hearing for the motion for a new 
trial, the trial court was provided with a stipulation as to the testimony Casey Nielsen 
would have offered, specifically that he gave all the money he collected to Mr. Hamblin. 
(Evid. Hrng. Rec. at 137). 
"Defense counsel has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation." 
State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). Counsel's failure to investigate and call 
these defense witnesses falls outside the range of professional assistance. Id. If Counsel 
does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability 
of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This is because 
a decision not to fully investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only after 
an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or 
not call particular witnesses for tactical reasons, or to introduce or not introduce certain 
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documents into evidence. Counsel's failure to make a reasonable investigation with 
respect to these witnesses satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test. 
The evidence not presented due to trial counsel's failure to investigate would have 
created an additional defense, directed at challenging the required mens rea for the 
offense. Failing to fully investigate and call these witnesses precluded the jury from 
being presented with this defense, and prejudiced the Appellant, thereby satisfying the 
second prong of the Strickland test. 
B. Failure to Obtain Crucial Discovery Documents 
In addition to failing to investigate and call crucial defense witnesses, trial counsel 
proceeded to trial without obtaining crucial discovery documents, clearly falling short of 
his "affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation." At the evidentiary hearing 
below, it was established that trial counsel was aware of the availability of some 35 boxes 
containing documents, ledger bibles and receipts from other docks at Carrier Lumping 
and failed to obtain them. (Evid. Hrng. R. at 15-16). The trial judge himself expressed 
that he had been flexible and suggested continuing the trial to enable trial counsel to 
further investigate the documents, an opportunity to further prepare and investigate that 
trial counsel declined. (Evid. Hrng R. at 8). 
Following standards established by Strickland and its progeny, counsel has a duty 
to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional 
decisions and informed legal choices; such decisions and choices can only be made 
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following an investigation of available options. Strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; 
however, strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2060, 2066. In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id.. Similarly, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that: 
"[i]f counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, 
including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance 
cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance.11 This is 
because a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is 
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. " State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In a case factually similar to the present case this Court turned to the following 
excerpt from Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212, 214 (Okla.Crim.App.1987) for guidance in 
determining whether an attorney's actions satisfied the requisite standard: 
When counsel knows of the existence of a person or persons who possess 
information relevant to his client's defense, and he fails to use due diligence to 
investigate that evidence, such a lack of industry cannot be justified as "strategic 
error." The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense 
Function 4-4.1, maintain that: "It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to 
facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." 
State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Crestani, the defendant was convicted of four counts of second degree felony 
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theft. He was charged with taking monies from a money market demand account 
belonging to the company of which he was a sole shareholder. Crestani, 111 P.2d at 
1086. The defendant's trial counsel failed to subpoena, obtain and review the critical 
bank records needed to present his defense. Id. In the present case, the documents in 
question were actually requested by trial counsel, the trial judge offered to grant a 
continuance to allow counsel to review them, but counsel failed to investigate or even 
obtain the documents. This decision was unreasonable, as the defense strategy mounted 
by trial counsel, poor accounting practices by Carrier Lumping, would have been 
bolstered by the vast accounting information which was made available. In addition, the 
required factual investigation would have given trial counsel information regarding a 
potential defense with respect to the mens rea of the Appellant and other dock leads who 
were deceived by Mr. Hamblin. 
Failure to obtain and review 35 boxes of relevant documents which counsel is 
aware of and has subpoenaed constitutes a "blatant lack of investigation [and] indicates a 
severe deficiency in the performance of trial counsel." Id. This deficiency was 
prejudicial to Mr. Colvin, deprived him of a fair trial and lead to an unreliable result, 
thereby also satisfying the standards required by Strickland. 
C. Trial counsel failed to provide an adequate defense 
A defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a 
clear and comprehensible manner. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) 
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(citing State v. Smith 706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985)). If a defendant presents 
sufficient evidence to justify a proposed jury instruction and the defendant requests such 
an instruction, the court has a duty to instruct the jury on that issue. Smith, 706 P.2d at 
1058 (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981)). If a defendant presents 
sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis, it is "within the province of the 
jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject [or 
accept] these alternative hypotheses." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-5 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1995); State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978). Trial counsel's failure to 
fully investigate the facts hindered his ability to provide an adequate defense and argue 
for appropriate instruction of the jury. 
Defendant's trial counsel failed to present evidence supporting the reasonable 
alternative hypothesis that Mr. Colvin lacked the mens rea necessary for this offense, and 
focused solely on the theory that Carrier Lumping Service had bad accounting practices. 
Trial counsel failed to call Casey Nielsen, dock lead for the produce dock who was 
mislead by Mr. Hamblin into giving him all of his deposits. Counsel also failed to call 
the various other dock leads and to obtain documents he had requested which also would 
have supported the reasonable alternative hypothesis and demonstrated a lack of mens rea 
required for the offense. 
Had the above evidence been introduced at trial, the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis would have been before the jury, the jury could have been instructed on this 
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theory of the case, and the outcome would likely have been more favorable to the 
Defendant. 
The failure of trial counsel to adequately investigate the facts of this case limited 
his efficacy and precluded him from providing the Appellant with his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's variance from the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance involved investigative and not tactical 
decisions, and were prejudicial to Mr. Colvin. 
Trial counsel's numerous prejudicial errors, each of which forms an adequate and 
independent basis for granting the Appellant a new trial. Further, the cumulative effect of 
these errors resulted in an unfair and unreliable result. Under the doctrine of cumulative 
error, a court may reverse a conviction if the cumulative impact of several errors 
undermines the court's confidence that the defendant received a fair trial. State v. Bryant, 
965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
II. A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY GIVING A JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY LOWERED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF 
PROOF, AND INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW TO THE JURY. 
Under rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, f,[u]nless a party 
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be 
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). The term 
"manifest injustice" is synonymous with the "plain error" standard, wherein an appellant 
must show that an error occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
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and the error was harmful. State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, TflO, 124 P.3d 259, 262 
(Utah Ct.App. 2005) (citing State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,ffl[ 40-41, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 
2003)). 
The Appellant now objects to the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial 
court as it unconstitutionally lowered the State's burden of proof, resulting in manifest 
injustice. In State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, the Utah Supreme Court 
abandoned many of the requirements previously established in Robertson regarding 
reasonable doubt instructions. Most importantly, the court expressly abandoned the " 
'obviate all reasonable doubtf element of the Robertson test" because the element "carries 
with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof 
below beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546, — P.3d ~ 
(Utah Ct.App. 2005)(citing Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at If 30). 
The reasonable doubt instruction given in this case, which contained the language, 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" erroneously and unjustly diminished the level of the 
State's burden of proof, as recently recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. The giving 
of this instruction resulted in manifest injustice, and constituted an error which the trial 
court could and should have remedied, and prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, due 
to this prejudicial error and manifest injustice, the Appellant respectfully requests that 
this court remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the fact that the Appellant's trial counsel was deficient to a degree that 
significantly prejudiced him, leading to an unfair and unreliable result and the fact that 
the reasonable doubt instruction given unconstitutionally reduced the State's burden of 
proof constituting manifest injustice, the Appellant's conviction should be vacated and a 
new trial granted in the interest of justice. 
DATED this Jj^ day of January 2006. 
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE 
Gregory G. Skordas 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to 
make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or 
the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to 
avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to 
which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
ADDENDUM B 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function 
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM C 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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